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There is something different about the state sales tax, or so it seems based on 
judicial decisions creating unique jurisdictional and apportionment standards for the tax.  
This article explores the concept of “sales tax exceptionalism,” and assesses whether the 
special treatment afforded to the sales tax is justified by the theoretical foundations of the 
tax.  In particular, the article examines whether theoretical justifications exist for the 
jurisdictional standard applied to the sales tax (a “physical presence” standard), as 
compared to the “economic presence” standard applied to the corporate income tax.  
Ultimately, the article concludes that only weak theoretical justifications support the 
different jurisdictional standards, and that recent changes to many states’ corporate 
income taxes further undercut the notion of “sales tax exceptionalism.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inconsistencies persist in the area of state taxation.  For example, 
different jurisdictional standards apply to different types of taxes.  A state may 
impose its sales tax on a retailer only if the retailer has a “physical presence” in 
the state, but the vast weight of authority holds that a retailer need only establish 
an “economic presence” before the state may assert its corporate income tax.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has twice considered the issue of sales tax jurisdiction, 
and has confirmed the physical-presence standard in both instances.1  While the 
Supreme Court has yet to address the jurisdictional scope of the state corporate 
income tax, several state courts have done so, and those courts have generally 
held that an economic presence suffices to subject a retailer to the corporate 
income tax.2   
Different standards also apply with respect to tax apportionment 
depending on the type of tax involved.  The U.S. Supreme Court clearly 
delineated the different apportionment standards in a pair of cases involving how 
the sale of bus tickets was to be taxed.  With respect to a state’s gross receipts tax 
(which the Supreme Court subsequently characterized as “a variety of tax on 
income”),3 the Court held that the bus company must apportion the gross income 
received from the sale of bus tickets among the states the bus passes through en 
                                                
1 This is despite significant criticism of the physical-presence standard.  See Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1992) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s retention 
of the physical-presence rule under the commerce clause, because “in today’s economy, physical 
presence frequently has very little to do with a transaction a State might seek to tax”); John A. 
Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 319, 329–44 (2003) (discussing critiques of Quill).  But see Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. 
TAX REV. 1 (2008) (defending the physical-presence standard, at least until Congress acts to 
overturn Quill). 
2 See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993); Lanco, Inc. v. 
Director, Div. of Tax’n, 879 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Comptroller of the Treas. v. Syl, Inc., 825 
A.2d 399 (Md. 2003); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); 
KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010); A&F Trademark, Inc. v. 
Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); Kmart Properties, Inc. v. Tax’n and Revenue Dep’t 
of the State of N.M., 131 P.3d 27 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 
2005); Tax Comm’r v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006).  But see J.C. 
Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).  What exactly constitutes 
economic presence, however, has been the subject of some variation among states and local taxing 
authorities.  See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 
157 (2012) (discussing the economic nexus standard and proposing federal intervention to ensure a 
uniform standard).   
3 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995).  See also 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 281 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the 
Court that, for purposes of constitutional review, there is no distinction between a corporate income 
tax and a gross-receipts tax.”).   
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route to its final destination.4  In effect, a state’s gross receipts tax applies only to 
the portion of a bus ticket price attributable to miles traveled within that state.  In 
contrast, the Court held that, for sales tax purposes, the price of a bus ticket need 
not be apportioned among the states through which the bus passes.  Instead, the 
state where the ticket is sold is permitted to apply its sales tax to the full price of 
the ticket, even though a portion of the price is attributable to service provided in 
other states.5   
With respect to both jurisdiction and apportionment, courts have treated 
the sales tax differently than other taxes, creating, though not expressly 
articulating, a form of “sales tax exceptionalism.”  As for the different 
jurisdictional treatment of the sales tax, the Court initially based the physical-
presence standard on concerns over the potential burden that would be imposed 
on businesses by requiring them to comply with varying sales tax requirements in 
thousands of different tax jurisdictions (at last count, there were over 9,600 
different state and local sales tax jurisdictions in the United States).6  That 
concern has been mitigated in recent years, however, through coordinated efforts 
made by many states to unify and simplify their sales tax statutes, as well as by 
technological advances that make sales tax compliance less onerous now than at 
the time the Supreme Court established the physical-presence jurisdictional 
standard.  As for apportionment, the Supreme Court has justified treating the 
sales tax differently than other taxes by concluding that the sales tax poses less 
risk of duplicative taxation than other taxes—in particular the gross receipts tax 
and the corporate income tax.   
This article examines whether “sales tax exceptionalism” makes sense, 
particularly in the context of a state’s authority to impose sales tax collection 
obligations on remote retailers.  It does so by first asking whether the theoretical 
justifications for the sales tax and the corporate income tax weigh in favor of 
treating the taxes differently for jurisdictional purposes.  The article contends that 
only tenuous theoretical justifications support different jurisdictional standards 
for the taxes.  The article then goes on to argue that there has been a 
“convergence” of the corporate income tax and the sales tax, as states 
increasingly adopt the single-sales factor method of apportioning their corporate 
income taxes.  This convergence renders the different jurisdictional standards for 
the taxes increasingly unjustifiable.   
                                                
4 Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealy, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948).   
5 Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 175.  
6 The Proper Role of Congress in State Taxation: Ensuring the Interstate Reach of State 
Taxes Does Not Harm the National Economy: Hearing on H.R. 3179 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Joseph Henchman, Vice President, Legal & State 
Projects, Tax Foundation), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/Henchman%2007242012.pdf 
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The article proceeds through the analysis described above by first 
introducing the concept of sales tax exceptionalism in Part I.  It does so by 
examining the different judicial treatment given to the sales tax for jurisdictional 
and apportionment purposes.  Part II then considers the theoretical foundations 
for the sales tax and the corporate income tax to assess whether sales tax 
exceptionalism has defensible theoretical moorings.  After concluding in Part II 
that the theoretical foundations for the taxes provide at best a weak justification 
for their different jurisdictional treatment, Part III explains why the convergence 
of the sales and corporate income taxes further undercuts the distinct 
jurisdictional standards applied to the two taxes.  The ultimate goal of the article 
is to further the academic literature criticizing sales tax exceptionalism, at least in 
the context of jurisdictional standards, by presenting a new argument against 
sales tax exceptionalism based on the convergence of the corporate income tax 
and the sales tax.   
I. SALES TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
There is something different about the sales tax—or so it seems, based 
on judicial decisions that have treated the sales tax differently than other taxes.  
This section examines those decisions in the jurisdictional and apportionment 
contexts.   
A. Jurisdictional Differences—The Concept of “Substantial Nexus” 
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,7 the Supreme Court held that, 
for a state tax to survive dormant Commerce Clause review, the tax must satisfy 
a four-part test.  The Complete Auto test requires that the tax “[1] is applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the 
services provided by the State.”8  The jurisdictional limit of a state tax is 
effectively determined by the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto test,9 
with the first prong (the “substantial nexus” prong) receiving the greater weight 
of both judicial and scholarly attention.10  One leading commentator has defined 
                                                
7 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
8 Id. at 279. 
9 The second and third prongs of the Complete Auto test ensure that a state does not 
attempt to shift its tax burden onto out-of-state residents.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 (“The second 
and third parts of that analysis, which require fair apportionment and non-discrimination, prohibit 
taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate commerce.”). 
10 Id. (“The first and fourth prongs, which require a substantial nexus and a relationship 
between the tax and state-provided services, limit the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure 
that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.”).  Articles abound addressing the 
“substantial nexus” prong of the Complete Auto test.  See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp & Michael J. 
McIntyre, State Taxation of Mail-Order Sales of Computers after Quill: An Evaluation of MTC 
Bulletin 95-1, 11 ST. TAX NOTES 140 (1996) (stating that Quill “creates an unfair competitive bias 
against in-state merchants that collect the sales tax”); Robert D. Plattner, Quill: 10 Years After, 25 
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“nexus” as “the connection that a state must have with a person, property, 
transaction, or activity in order for a state to exercise its taxing power 
constitutionally over such person, property, transaction, or activity.”11  Under 
Complete Auto, a taxpayer must have “substantial” nexus with a state before the 
state may assert its taxing jurisdiction over the taxpayer.  One reason for the 
extensive scholarly attention given to the issue of nexus is that courts have 
reached different conclusions as to what constitutes substantial nexus depending 
on the type of tax involved.  
1. Substantial Nexus in the Sales Tax Context 
The Supreme Court has on two occasions ruled that, for sales tax 
purposes,12 a taxpayer has “substantial nexus” only if the taxpayer has an in-state 
physical presence.  The two cases—National Bellas Hess v. Illinois13 and Quill v. 
North Dakota14—involved practically identical disputes: states attempting to 
                                                                                                                     
ST. TAX NOTES 1017 (2002) (describing the Quill decision as “a blunder of major proportions”).  
Far fewer articles address the “fairly related” prong.  See, e.g., Phillip M. Zinn, The Requirements 
of “Substantial Nexus” and “Fairly Related” Under the Commerce Clause, 2007 ST. & LOC. TAX 
LAW. 59 (2007); R. Douglas Harmon, Judicial Review Under Complete Auto Transit: When is a 
State Tax on Energy-Producing Resources “Fairly Related”?, 1982 DUKE L.J. 682 (1982).   
11 Walter Hellerstein, A Primer on State Tax Nexus: Law, Power, & Policy, 55 ST. TAX 
NOTES 555 (2010).   
12 The cases discussed in this section technically involved the states’ use taxes rather than 
their sales taxes.  These are different taxes serving complementary purposes.  States have their own 
individual definitions of the sales tax and the use tax, and these may differ from state to state.  The 
Multistate Tax Commissioner (MTC) has provided a general definition of the sales tax as “a tax 
imposed with respect to the transfer for a consideration of ownership, possession or custody of 
tangible personal property or the rendering of services measured by the price of the tangible 
personal property transferred or services rendered and which is required by State or local law to be 
separately stated from the sales price by the seller, or which is customarily separately stated from 
the sales price . . .”  THE MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N COMPACT, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION & 
ENABLING ACT, art. II, ¶ 7.  The MTC’s definition of the use tax is “a nonrecurring tax, other than a 
sales tax, which (a) is imposed on or with respect to the exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership, possession or custody of that 
property or the leasing of that property from another including any consumption, keeping, retention, 
or other use of tangible personal property and (b) is complementary to a sales tax.”  THE 
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N COMPACT, art. II, ¶ 8.  Because the nexus requirements for sales tax and 
use tax have been stated by the Supreme Court to be the same, I use the more familiar term “sales 
tax” rather than “use tax” throughout this article.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (“Although we have 
not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement that 
Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the 
Bellas Hess rule.”) (emphasis added); id. at 315 (“Whether or not a State may compel a vendor to 
collect a sales or use tax may turn on the presence in the taxing State of a small sales force, plant, 
or office.”).  See also JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 12.01 
(3rd ed.) (“The term ‘sales tax’ embraces a large variety of levies in force in the United States” 
including “‘compensatory use tax.’”).   
13 National Bellas Hess v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).  
14 Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.  
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require retailers to collect sales tax even though the retailers were mail-order 
companies that had no physical presence in the states.  The retailers in both cases 
argued that by doing so the states exceeded the constitutional limits of their 
taxing authority.   
In Bellas Hess, the earlier of the two cases (decided in 1967), the Court 
held that Illinois’ attempt to require the remote retailer15 to collect sales tax 
violated both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  In its opinion, the Court did not delineate its analysis of the two 
constitutional provisions,16 but grounded its decision on the concern that if every 
one of the nation’s thousands of taxing jurisdictions imposed similar tax 
collection requirements, “[n]ational interstate business” would be “entangle[d] . . . 
in a virtual welter of complicated obligations . . . .”17 
Twenty-five years after Bellas Hess, in Quill, the Court again considered 
whether a state could constitutionally require sales tax collection by “a taxpayer 
whose only connection with customers in the State [was] by common carrier or 
the United States mail.”18  Quill overturned Bellas Hess to the extent that the 
earlier case relied on the Due Process Clause as a basis for finding that a state 
exceeded its authority in requiring remote retailers to collect sales tax.19  In the 
time between the decisions in Bellas Hess in 1967 and Quill in 1992, the Court’s 
due process jurisprudence had evolved and no longer required a litigant to have 
an in-state physical presence to satisfy the due process standard of “fair warning 
[that its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”20  
                                                
15 According to the Court, the taxpayer in Bellas Hess “does not maintain in Illinois any 
office, distribution house, sales house, warehouse or any other place of business; it does not have in 
Illinois any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or take orders, 
to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service merchandise it sells; it does not own any 
tangible property, real or personal, in Illinois; it has no telephone listing in Illinois and it has not 
advertised its merchandise for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or television in Illinois.”  
386 U.S. at 754 (adopting the Illinois Supreme Court’s description of the taxpayer’s lack of 
contacts with the state).  The Court further characterized the taxpayer’s connection with customers 
in Illinois as only “by common carrier or the United States mail.”  Id. at 758.   
16 The Court stated, “These two claims are closely related.  For the test whether a 
particular state exaction is such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate trade 
between the States, and the test for a State's compliance with the requirements of due process in 
this area are similar.”  Id. at 756. 
17Id. at 759–60.  At the time of Bellas Hess, the Court stated that there existed over 2,300 
taxing jurisdictions in the United States.  Id. at 759 n.12 (citing REP. OF THE SPEC. SUBCOMM. ON 
STATE TAX’N OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Maryland 
H.R.Rep.No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 827 (1965)).  Interestingly, by the time of the Quill 
decision in 1992, the Court noted that there were “6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions” in the United 
States.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.   
18 Quill, 504 U.S. at 301.   
19 Id. at 308.   
20 Id. (“[I]t matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs 
rather than a phalanx of drummers: The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a 
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The Quill Court extended this more expansive due process standard beyond the 
personal jurisdiction context to the tax context and found that the remote retailer 
in question had adequate notice, from a due process perspective, that its 
commercial activities in North Dakota would subject it to the state’s taxing 
authority.21   
The Quill Court affirmed Bellas Hess, however, with respect to the 
previous determination that the Commerce Clause requires physical presence 
before a state may constitutionally impose a sales tax collection obligation.22  The 
Court provided several reasons for maintaining the physical-presence standard 
under the Commerce Clause: (1) the benefits resulting from a bright-line rule, 
such as fostering investment, minimizing uncertainty, and reducing litigation;23 
(2) the stability resulting from adherence to stare decisis;24 (3) the avoidance of 
“thorny questions concerning the retroactive application of [sales and use taxes 
that] might trigger substantial unanticipated liability for mail-order houses”;25 
and (4) the deference given to Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause power 
and ultimately decide the appropriate nexus standard for remote commerce.26  
Thus, despite the shift in its due process jurisprudence to a more 
expansive approach and despite acknowledgment by the Quill majority that the 
“physical presence” nexus standard had shortcomings,27  the Court in Quill 
affirmed the standard under the Commerce Clause.  Quill has become 
increasingly important in recent years due to the rapid expansion of e-
commerce.28  Because of the increasing loss of tax revenues resulting from the 
growth of remote commerce, some states have made legislative attempts to 
circumvent the physical-presence standard and require remote retailers to collect 
                                                                                                                     
corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State.”).  See William Joel Kolarik, Untangling 
Substantial Nexus, 64 TAX LAW. 851, 881 (2011) (laying out the Court’s justifications for shifting 
from Pennoyer’s physical-presence test for personal jurisdiction to International Shoe’s broader 
jurisdictional test).   
21 See Brannon P. Denning, Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction, 64 ST. TAX NOTES 
837 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court may favor a return to a more restrictive due process 
standard) (citing J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)).  
22 504 U.S. at 317–18.  
23 Id. at 315–16.  
24 Id. at 317.   
25 Id. at 318 n.10.   
26 Id. at 318.   
27 See, e.g., id. at 315 (conceding that “[l]ike other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule 
appears artificial at its edges”).    
28 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 E-COMMERCE MULTI-
SECTOR DATA TABLES (released May 10, 2012) at Historical Table 5, “U.S. Retail Trade Sales – 
Total & E-commerce: 1998–2010,” available at 
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2010/all2010tables.html (showing total U.S. e-commerce retail 
trade at $74.2 billion in 2004 and $168.9 billion in 2010).   
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sales tax.29  In addition, in the wake of Quill numerous states streamlined and 
coordinated their sales tax statutes in an attempt to convince Congress to exercise 
its Commerce Clause power and overturn the judicially created physical-presence 
standard.30  In spite of these efforts, however, Congress has declined to act and 
physical presence remains the existing standard for a state to impose a sales tax 
collection obligation on retailers.   
2. Substantial Nexus in the Corporate Income Tax Context 
Professor John Swain put it succinctly when he wrote, “there is no 
‘Bellas Hess’ of corporate income tax jurisprudence.”31  In other words, no U.S. 
Supreme Court case expressly sets forth a nexus standard for the corporate 
income tax, as Bellas Hess did for the sales tax.32  While the Supreme Court in 
Quill intimated that the physical-presence standard applies only in the sales tax 
context,33 it did not expressly state this limitation.34  Thus, state courts have been 
left to divine the Supreme Court’s intention with respect to whether the physical-
presence standard applies outside the sales tax context.  Generally speaking, state 
courts have read Quill as limiting the standard to the sales tax.  My purpose in 
                                                
29 See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2012) (New York’s “Amazon 
Law”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-102(3)(b)(II) (2011) (Colorado’s use tax reporting statute); CAL. 
REV. & TAX CODE § 6203(c)(1) (West 2011) (California’s “affiliate nexus” statute).   
30 Following Quill, several states joined together to make their sales tax statutes more 
uniform and simple, thereby hoping to refute one of the Supreme Court’s rationales for upholding 
the physical-presence standard in Quill—the “virtual welter of complicated obligations” making up 
the state and local sales tax system in the United States.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.  These efforts 
resulted in the Streamlined Sales & Use Tax Agreement.  See infra note 107; see also 
STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BOARD, INC., 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Aug. 14, 2012) (“The 
goal of this effort is to find solutions for the complexity in state sales tax systems that resulted in 
the U.S. Supreme Court holding (Bellas Hess v. Illinois and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota) that a 
state may not require a seller that does not have a physical presence in the state to collect tax on 
sales into the state.”); Zelinsky, supra note 1, at 38–39 (“[A] fundamental goal of the [Streamlined 
Sales & Use Tax] Project is to persuade Congress that the states participating in the Project have 
made it easier for firms to comply with such states’ sales and use tax laws.”). 
31 John Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 363 (2003). 
32 Perhaps one reason for the absence of a controlling Supreme Court decision with 
respect to corporate income tax jurisdiction is the existence of P.L. 86-272 (the Interstate Income 
Act of 1959), which prohibits states from imposing their income tax on retailers whose only contact 
with a state is to solicit the sale of tangible personal property. Pub. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–384 (2012)). 
33 Again, I am using “sales tax” as shorthand for sales and use tax.  See supra note 12.   
34 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (“Although we have not, in our review of other types of 
taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and 
use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule.”); id. at 317 (“In sum, 
although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes we have not 
adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not 
compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes.”). 
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this section is not to justify that conclusion, as others have already ably done.35  
Instead, my purpose is only to explain that most courts have applied a different 
nexus standard for the income tax than for the sales tax, thereby establishing 
sales tax exceptionalism in the jurisdictional context.   
The topic of corporate income tax jurisdiction has frequently arisen in 
the area of intellectual property licensing, and the South Carolina Supreme Court 
issued the seminal opinion on this issue just one year after the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Quill.  In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,36 
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the state had constitutional authority 
to require Geoffrey, Inc., a subsidiary of Toys R Us (“Geoffrey”), to pay income 
tax in South Carolina despite its lack of physical presence in the state.  Geoffrey 
was a Delaware corporation with no employees, offices, or tangible property in 
South Carolina.37  Geoffrey owned and licensed trademarks, among them the 
“Toys R Us” name, to Toys R Us stores operating in several states, including 
South Carolina.  Under the terms of the licensing agreement, Geoffrey received 
“a royalty of one percent of the net sales by [Toys R Us], or any of its affiliated, 
associated, or subsidiary companies, of the Licensed Products sold or the 
Licensed Services rendered under the Licensed Mark.”38  South Carolina sought 
to tax the share of this royalty income attributable to Toys R Us operations in the 
state.   
Despite its lack of any physical presence in South Carolina, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court held that Geoffrey satisfied Complete Auto’s 
“substantial nexus” requirement.  The court characterized Geoffrey’s reliance on 
the physical-presence standard of Bellas Hess as “misplaced.”39  Without much 
discussion or support, the court stated, “It is well settled that the taxpayer need 
                                                
35 Professor Swain gives a particularly insightful analysis of the proper nexus standard for 
the corporate income tax in his article.  Swain, supra note 31.  Professor Denning also summarizes 
the major arguments against the physical presence requirement in a recent article as follows:  
 
[The physical presence standard] belied a formalism inconsistent with both the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction cases and its embrace of pragmatism in other areas of 
interstate taxation.  Moreover, the argument goes, the presence of de facto exemption 
from tax for remote sellers violates principles of sound tax policy, unfairly burdens 
ordinary bricks-and-mortar retailers, and has—with the rise of electronic commerce—
deprived state and local governments of billions of dollars in tax revenue.   
 
Brannon P. Denning, Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction, 64 ST. TAX NOTES 837, 841 
(2012).   
36 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).   
37 Id. at 15.  In fact, Geoffrey had no full-time employees at all.  Id. at 15 n.1.   
38 Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 Id. at 18.  In making this statement, the South Carolina Supreme Court cited to Quill as 
“not[ing] that the physical presence requirement had not been extended to other types of taxes.”  Id. 
at 18 n.4.   
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not have a tangible, physical presence in a state for income to be taxable there.  
The presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus.”40   
Several subsequent intellectual property licensing cases have followed 
Geoffrey’s lead by holding that the physical-presence standard does not apply to 
the corporate income tax.41  Some of these cases have provided more extensive 
discussion than Geoffrey of the reasons for applying a different nexus standard to 
the corporate income tax than to the sales tax.  In particular, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals in A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson42 gave a far more detailed 
explanation of why it refused to apply the physical-presence standard in a case 
with essentially identical facts to Geoffrey.  First, the North Carolina court noted 
that “the tone in the Quill opinion hardly indicated a sweeping endorsement of 
the bright-line test it preserved, and the Supreme Court’s hesitancy to embrace 
the test certainly counsels against expansion of it.”43  Second, the court reasoned 
that “retention of the Bellas Hess test [in Quill] was grounded, in no small part, 
on the principle of stare decisis and the ‘substantial reliance’ on the physical-
presence test, which had ‘become part of the basic framework of a sizable 
industry.’”44  According to the court, neither of these considerations—stare 
decisis nor industry reliance—applied in the context of the corporate income tax, 
therefore distinguishing the case from Quill.45   
Third, the North Carolina court explained that “there are important 
distinctions between sales and use taxes and income and franchise taxes,” and 
these differences favored limiting the physical-presence standard to the sales 
tax.46   Specifically, the court stated that sales tax cases requiring physical 
                                                
40 Id. at 18.  The only support the South Carolina Supreme Court provided for this 
statement were a pre-Bellas Hess Supreme Court case (Int’l Harvester Co. v. Wis., 322 U.S. 435 
(1944)), a New Mexico Supreme Court case (Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t, 
605 P.2d 251 (1979)) that made no mention of Bellas Hess, and a statement from Professor 
Hellerstein’s state tax treatise (see HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12).  While these sources certainly 
support the court’s conclusion, one would think that with Quill decided just a year before, the South 
Carolina court would have provided a more thorough discussion of its reasoning in limiting the 
physical-presence requirement to the sales tax context.   
41 See, e.g., KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010); Capital 
One Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 2009) (adopting a flexible economic 
substance analysis rather than physical-presence test in context of financial institution excise tax); 
Tax Comm’r of W. Va. v. MBNA America Bank, 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2007); Geoffrey, Inc. v. 
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 879 
A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Sec’y, Dep’t of Revenue, State of La. v. Gap 
(Apparel), Inc., 886 So.2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Borden Chems. & Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 
N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).  
42 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).   
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presence “‘were based on the vendor’s activities in the state, whereas’ the income 
and franchise taxes in the instant case are based solely on ‘the use of [the 
taxpayer’s] property in th[is] state by the licensee[s]’ and not on any activity by 
the taxpayers in the State.”47  In other words, the sales tax applies to a taxpayer’s 
activity in the taxing state—the sale of goods into the state—but the dispute in 
A&F Trademark involved only the use of a taxpayer’s trademark property in the 
state—not any activity by the taxpayer in the state.  Because the issue in A&F 
Trademark was 
not based on the taxpayers’ activity in North Carolina, but rather 
on the taxpayers’ receipt of income from the use of the 
taxpayers’ property in this State by a commonly controlled third 
party, ‘it would [be] inappropriate and, indeed anomalous . . . [to 
determine] nexus by [the taxpayers’] activities or [their] physical 
presence’ in North Carolina.48 
In essence, the court seems to be saying that the income North Carolina 
sought to tax resulted from the use of the taxpayer’s intangible intellectual 
property in the state, so it would be incongruous to require the taxpayer’s 
physical presence as a requirement to taxing that income.  Put simply, why 
require physical presence to tax income derived from intangible (i.e., non-
physical) property?  
Finally, the court also pointed out structural differences between the 
income tax and the sales tax that justified different treatment, including (1) that 
the sales tax “can make the taxpayer an agent of the state, obligated to collect the 
tax from the consumer at the point of sale and then pay it over to the taxing 
entity”;49 and (2) the state income tax is usually paid only once a year, to one 
taxing jurisdiction and at one rate, “[but] a sales and use tax can be due 
periodically to more than one taxing jurisdiction within a state and at varying 
rates.” 50   In the court’s opinion, these structural differences rendered the 
corporate income tax less administratively burdensome to taxpayers than the 
sales tax.   
 Based on these reasons, the North Carolina court “reject[ed] the 
contention that physical presence is the sine qua non of a state’s jurisdiction to 
tax under the Commerce Clause for purposes of income and franchise taxes.”51  
Rather, the court held that “where a wholly-owned subsidiary licenses 
trademarks to a related retail company operating stores located [in a state], there 
                                                
47Id. (quoting Jerome R. Hellerstein, Geoffrey and the Physical Presence Nexus 
Requirement of Quill, 8 ST. TAX NOTES 671, 676 (1995)).   
48 605 S.E. 2d at 195 (quoting Hellerstein, supra note 47, at 676).   
49 Id. 
50 Id.    
51 Id. 
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exists a substantial nexus with the State sufficient to satisfy the Commerce 
Clause.”52   
Not all state courts have reached the same conclusion as A&F Trademark 
to limit Quill’s physical presence standard to the sales tax,53 though most have.54  
Moreover, those few courts that have extended the physical-presence requirement 
beyond the sales tax have provided scant support for that result, as illustrated by 
the conclusory rationale given by the Texas Court of Appeals in finding that an 
out-of-state corporation lacked substantial nexus with the state for franchise tax 
purposes:  
While the decisions in Quill and Bellas Hess involved sales and 
use taxes, we see no principled distinction when the basic issue 
remains whether the state can tax the corporation at all under the 
Commerce Clause.  As construed in Quill and Bellas Hess, when 
the corporation conducts its activity solely through interstate 
commerce and lacks any physical presence in the state, no 
sufficient nexus exists to permit the state to assess tax.55 
Likewise, another state court to apply the physical presence standard 
outside the sales tax context justified that result by claiming a lack of authority to 
do otherwise: “Any constitutional distinctions between the franchise and excise 
                                                
52 Id.    
53 See, e.g., J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1999) (stating, in a discussion of the proper nexus standards for Tennessee’s corporate franchise 
and excise taxes, that “[w]hile it is true that the Bellas Hess and Quill decisions focused on use 
taxes, we find no basis for concluding that the analysis should be different in the present case”); 
ACME Royalty Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Mo. 2002) (finding no income tax nexus 
for Delaware holding companies that had no “property, payroll, or sales, in the State or Missouri”); 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the 
physical-presence standard does not apply to Seattle’s business & occupation tax, but agreeing with 
the J.C. Penney court that the standard does apply to franchise taxes). 
54 At least one court has also applied the less rigorous “economic presence” standard 
outside the context of intellectual property licensing.  See Tax Comm’r of the State v. MBNA Am. 
Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006) (finding nexus for income and franchise tax purposes 
for a bank with no in-state physical presence); but see id. at 239 (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (“The 
reality is that the United States Supreme Court has not generally treated the question of state 
authority to tax interstate commerce as turning on the specific type of tax involved.  Rather, the 
United States Supreme Court has focused instead on the effect of the tax which the taxing state 
seeks to levy on interstate commerce, regardless of the type of tax . . . . It would be a strange 
constitutional doctrine that would countenance one nexus standards for sales and use taxes under 
the Commerce Clause, and a more relaxed nexus standard for corporate net income and other state 
taxes.”).   
55 Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Tex. App. 2000). 
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taxes presented here and the use taxes contemplated in Bellas Hess and Quill are 
not within the purview of this court to discern.”56  
Of those courts that have applied Quill’s physical presence standard 
beyond the sales tax context, none has answered the arguments for limiting Quill 
set forth in either the A&F Trademark decision or in the academic literature.57  
Nevertheless, as stated at the outset of this section, for present purposes we need 
not determine which side has the better argument.  We need only recognize that 
most courts considering the issue have applied different nexus standards 
depending on the type of tax involved, with a significant majority limiting the 
physical presence standard to the sales tax context.   
B. Apportionment—Another Instance of Sales Tax Exceptionalism 
In addition to the “substantial nexus” requirement, the Complete Auto 
test also requires that a state tax be “fairly apportioned.”58  As mentioned in the 
Introduction, the Supreme Court has reached different results with respect to the 
apportionment requirement depending on the type of tax involved.  Before 
discussing the Supreme Court case law, however, a more detailed explanation of 
apportionment may prove helpful.    
“Apportionment” refers to the method by which “the measure of a tax is 
divided by formula . . . based on the use of selected factors for attributing the tax 
base to the states in which the taxpayer uses its property, carries on its activities, 
or earns income.”59  In other words, apportionment divides a tax base among 
multiple states, each of which has a claim to tax the activity or property in 
question.  Apportionment is most easily illustrated in the context of the income 
tax.  A state may not, of course, tax all of a taxpayer’s income simply because the 
state has personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer.60  If it could, duplicative 
taxation would be pervasive, as every state with jurisdiction over a taxpayer (and 
there may be many) could seek to tax the full amount of the taxpayer’s taxable 
income.  As a result, the same income would potentially be subject to taxation 
multiple times.61   
                                                
56 J.C. Penney, 19 S.W.3d at 839.  See also Am. Online, Inc. v. Johnson, No. M2001-
00927-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751434 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (moderating the court’s 
holding in J.C. Penney by stating that nexus does not necessarily equate to physical presence in all 
instances or “J.C. Penney would simply substitute ‘physical presence’ for ‘nexus’ as the first prong 
of the Complete Auto Transit test”).  
57 See Swain, supra note 31 (arguing to limit the physical presence requirement to the 
sales and use tax).   
58 Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
59 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at ¶ 8.05. 
60 See id. at ¶ 8.02[1] (discussing taxpayers’ constitutional right to a division of the tax 
base among states).   
61 See Cent. R.R. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 612 (1962) (“[M]ultiple 
taxation of interstate operations . . . offends the Commerce Clause.”); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN 
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To prevent this from happening, states are constitutionally required to 
use some method of dividing a taxpayer’s income so that only that share of 
income attributable to activities performed by the taxpayer within a state is 
subject to that state’s tax.62  This method of dividing the taxpayer’s income is 
known as “apportionment.”  While relatively simple in theory, apportionment 
constitutes one of the most tricky and controversial aspects of state taxation.63  
For example, assume a corporate taxpayer (“Taxpayer”) has most of its 
manufacturing operations in State A, all of its warehousing facilities in State B, 
and the majority of its sales in State C.  How should States A, B, and C divvy up 
Taxpayer’s taxable income so that each state applies its income tax to that state’s 
fair share, but no more than its fair share, of Taxpayer’s income?64  
Traditionally, states have answered this question by using a three-factor 
formula.65  The formula calculates a ratio, which is then applied to the taxpayer’s 
total taxable income to apportion a constitutionally acceptable share of income to 
the taxing state.  The three-factor formula is intended to approximate the value 
derived from a taxpayer’s in-state activities, and therefore the amount of the 
taxpayer’s income attributable to (and taxable by) the state.66  The apportionment 
                                                                                                                     
supra note 12 at ¶ 8.01 (“Under the Court's contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine, a taxpayer 
has the right to a division of the tax base if it can demonstrate that it is taxable . . . in another state.  
This conclusion follows inexorably from the principle that the Commerce Clause protects a 
multistate taxpayer from the risk of multiple taxation.”).   
62 See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (“The vice of the statute 
as applied to receipts from interstate sales is that the tax includes in its measure, without 
apportionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce; and that the exaction is of 
such a character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by states in which the 
goods are sold as well as those in which they are manufactured.”). 
63 The difficulty of apportioning income fairly has been acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court, which has gone so far as to state that “[a]llocating income among various taxing 
jurisdictions bears some resemblance . . . to slicing a shadow.”  Container Corp. of Am. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192 (1983).  See also Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 
254 U.S. 113, 120–21 (1920) (“The legislature, in attempting to put upon this business its fair share 
of the burden of taxation, was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits 
earned by the processes conducted within its borders.”).   
64 See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1989) (“[T]he central purpose [of 
Complete Auto’s apportionment requirement] is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of 
an interstate transaction.”).   
65 An alternative to the “factor” approach described here is for states to use “separate 
accounting” as the method for determining the amount of income attributable to a corporation’s 
activities in an individual state.  Under separate accounting, income is assigned to a state “by 
hypothesizing the income which would have been earned in that state if the corporation’s in-state 
activities had been conducted by an independent entity dealing with the rest of the corporation on 
an arm’s-length basis.”  Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 13 (2008).   
66 Formula apportionment (as the use of the three-factor formula is called) is “employed 
as a rough approximation of a corporation’s income that is reasonably related to the activities 
conducted within the taxing State.”  Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).   
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ratio is determined by averaging the proportion of the taxpayer’s in-state payroll, 
property, and sales, relative to the taxpayer’s total payroll, property, and sales.67  
During the 1950s, almost every state used these same three factors—payroll, 
property, and sales—to apportion income.  This consistency resulted from the 
promulgation of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) 
in 1957.68  Under UDITPA, each of the three factors receives equal weight in 
determining the percentage of a taxpayer’s income that should be apportioned to 
the taxing state.69  So, for example, if Taxpayer has 30% of its property, 50% of 
its payroll, and 10% of its sales in State A, then 30%70 of Taxpayer’s taxable 
income would be apportioned to, and taxable by, State A. 71   Assuming 
Taxpayer’s total taxable income were $100,000, State A would apply its income 
tax to $30,000 of Taxpayer’s income. 
As with nexus, however, the approach to apportionment differs 
depending on the type of tax involved.  But unlike nexus, this difference has been 
clearly articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a pair of cases involving 
essentially identical facts but different taxes.   
1. Apportionment in the Gross Receipts Tax Context 
In Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., of New York v. Mealey,72 the Court 
held that New York’s gross receipts tax, as applied to a New York-based 
subsidiary of Greyhound Lines (“Greyhound NY”), violated the Commerce 
Clause because the state failed to apportion the tax base (the bus company’s 
gross income) among New York and the other states through which the 
company’s buses traveled.  Instead, New York sought to apply its gross receipts 
                                                
67 The Supreme Court gave a succinct explanation of three-factor apportionment in 
Moorman:  
 
The three-factor formula yields a percentage representing an average of three 
ratios: property within the State to total property, payroll within the State to total payroll, 
and sales within the State to total sales.  [This percentage is] multiplied by the adjusted 
total net income to arrive at . . . taxable net income [apportioned to the taxing state].  This 
net income figure is then multiplied by the tax rate to compute the actual tax obligation of 
the taxpayer.  
 
Id. at 270 n.3.   
68 As discussed further below, at its height UDITPA’s three-factor formula was in effect 
in all but two states with corporate income taxes.  See infra Part III, discussing Moorman.   
69 UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 9 (1957).   
70 Averaging these three factors under UDITPA’s three-factor apportionment formula, so 
that 30% = [(30% + 50% + 10%)/3]. 
71 See Darien Shanske, A New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The State 
Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax Complement, 66 TAX L. REV. 101, 109–11 (2012) 
(providing concise explanation of state corporate income tax apportionment).   
72 334 U.S. 653 (1948).   
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tax to Greyhound NY’s total gross income, even though 43% of the mileage 
traveled by the company’s buses “lay in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.”73   
The bus routes at issue in Central Greyhound originated and terminated 
in New York, but passed through New Jersey and Pennsylvania en route to their 
final New York destination.  Because the routes both started and ended in New 
York, the New York Court of Appeals had found that the gross income 
Greyhound NY received from ticket sales did not implicate “interstate 
commerce,” and therefore did not require apportionment.74  The Supreme Court 
disagreed with this conclusion.  To characterize the routes as intrastate just 
because they started and ended in New York was “to indulge in a fiction,” 
according to the Court.75  Instead, the Court found that because the routes 
involved a significant amount of travel through states other than New York, the 
ticket sales constituted interstate commerce.76   
After making this initial determination that the bus routes at issue 
implicated interstate commerce, the Court expressed concern over the possibility 
of duplicate taxation if New York were allowed to tax the full amount of 
Greyhound NY’s gross income.77  The Court reasoned that if New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania—the other states through which Greyhound NY’s buses traveled—
made “appropriately apportioned claims against that substantial part of the 
business of appellant to which they afford protection, we do not see how on 
principle and in precedent such a claim could be denied.”78  In other words, New 
York sought to apply its gross receipts tax to all the gross income generated by 
sales of bus tickets traveling not only through New York but also through New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania.  The Court found, however, that these other states had 
legitimate claims to tax a portion of Greyhound NY’s gross income.79  Because 
of the risk that multiple states would tax the same income, the Court required 
apportionment of New York’s gross receipts tax based on “the mileage [traveled] 
within the State” by Greyhound NY’s buses.80  With 57.47% of the total mileage 
of the journeys over the routes in question traversed within New York, and 
                                                
73 Id. at 660.   
74 Id. at 655 (stating that the New York Court of Appeals “proceeded to pass upon the 
constitutional issues and expressly held that ‘there is no constitutional objection to taxation of total 
receipts here. This is not interstate commerce.’”).  
75 Id. at 659.   
76 Id. at 655–56 (“It is too late in the day to deny that transportation that leaves a State 
and enters another State is ‘Commerce . . . among the several States.’”).   
77 See Kolarik, supra note 20, at 866 (“‘[F]air apportionment’ concerns the risk of 
multiple taxation—the idea that a state may only tax the portion of a transaction that is fairly 
attributable to that state.”). 
78 Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 662.   
79 In fact, Pennsylvania did assert its own gross receipts tax against a share of the bus 
company’s gross income.  See id. at 662.  
80 Id. at 663.   
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42.53% of the total mileage traversed within New Jersey and Pennsylvania,81 the 
Court only permitted New York to apply its gross receipts tax to 57.47% of 
Greyhound’s gross income.  The remaining 43.53% was left for Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey to tax (or not, should those states so choose).82   
Thus, with respect to a state’s gross receipts tax, the Court requires 
apportionment among the states in which services are provided.  In Central 
Greyhound, that apportionment was based on the in-state versus out-of-state 
mileage traveled by the taxpayer’s buses.  The Court likewise requires 
apportionment of net income in cases involving the state corporate income tax, 83 
though the apportionment typically is based on factors other than miles 
traveled.84   Consequently, for both gross receipt and corporate income tax 
purposes, the Court requires apportionment based on in-state versus out-of-state 
factors.      
2. Apportionment in the Sales Tax Context 
Because of the similarity of the facts involved, the Court’s later decision 
in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,85 stands in stark contrast 
with Central Greyhound.  Jefferson Lines had failed to “collect or remit the sales 
taxes for tickets it had sold in Oklahoma for bus travel from Oklahoma to other 
States.”86  After the bus company filed for bankruptcy, Oklahoma filed a proof of 
claim, arguing that the company owed sales tax on these ticket sales.87  Jefferson 
Lines countered that Central Greyhound precluded Oklahoma from imposing its 
sales tax on the bus ticket sales, since “some of th[e] value [from the sales] 
derives from bus travel through other States.”88  Jefferson Lines further argued 
                                                
81 Id. at 662.   
82 Id. at 663. 
83 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm.’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436 (1980) (“It 
long has been established that the income of a business operating in interstate commerce is not 
immune from fairly apportioned state taxation.”) (emphasis added).  See also HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at ¶ 8.02[2][b] (disagreeing with state court decisions allowing 
unapportioned taxation of banks’ income).  The Court has never had to deal expressly with a state’s 
attempt to tax the unapportioned income of a multistate corporation.  See HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at ¶ 8.02[3] (explaining that because all states with corporate income 
taxes provide for apportionment, “the Supreme Court has never had occasion to address directly the 
question whether a state may tax the unapportioned net income of a domestic corporation that does 
business in, or derives income from, other states”).    
84 As explained above, the income tax is typically apportioned according to some 
combination of property, payroll, and sales that a taxpayer has in the taxing state.  See supra note 
67.   
85 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).   
86 Id. at 178.  The gross income at issue in Central Greyhound related to tickets for travel 
both originating and ending in New York, though the routes involved passed through bordering 
states on their way to their ultimate New York destination.   
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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that allowing Oklahoma to impose its sales tax “presents the danger of multiple 
taxation . . . because any other State through which a bus travels while providing 
the services sold in Oklahoma [would] be able to impose taxes of their own upon 
Jefferson or its passengers for use of the roads.”89   
Despite its holding in Central Greyhound, the Court upheld the 
imposition of Oklahoma’s sales tax on the full price of the tickets at issue in 
Jefferson Lines.  After reviewing holdings from various cases involving the 
apportionment of other types of taxes (including the gross receipts tax in Central 
Greyhound), the Court explained that the sales tax was different:  
In reviewing sales taxes for fair share [i.e., apportionment] . . . 
we have had to set a different course.  A sale of goods is most 
readily viewed as a discrete event facilitated by the laws and 
amenities of the place of sale, and the transaction itself does not 
readily reveal the extent to which completed or anticipated 
interstate activity affects the value on which a buyer is taxed.  
We have therefore consistently approved taxation of sales 
without any division of the tax base among different States, and 
have instead held such taxes properly measurable by the gross 
charge for the purchase, regardless of any activity outside the 
taxing jurisdiction that might have preceded the sale or might 
occur in the future.90   
The Court further explained its distinct treatment of the sales tax by 
identifying the “freedom of purchase” as the activity constituting the basis for 
applying the sales tax, and noting that a purchase occurs in only one state.  
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the risk of duplicate taxation, which played such a 
central role in the Court’s decision to require apportionment in Central 
Greyhound, was found not to apply in the sales tax context: “The taxable event 
[with respect to the sale of services, such as the bus service at issue in Jefferson 
Lines] comprises agreement, payment, and delivery of some of the services in the 
taxing State; no other State can claim to be the site of the same combination.”91  
Consequently, the Court found the concern over duplicative taxation inapplicable 
in Jefferson Lines.92  This distinguishing factor led the Court to reach a different 
conclusion than it had in Central Greyhound.  The Court in Jefferson Lines held 
that the sales tax need not be apportioned among the states, but rather that the 
state in which the sale occurs may apply its sales tax to the full, unapportioned 
                                                
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 186.   
91 Id. at 176.  See also id. at 188 (stating that the “taxable event” in Jefferson Lines, the 
sale of the bus ticket in Oklahoma, was “wholly local”).   
92 Id. at 191 (“In sum, the sales taxation here is not open to the double taxation analysis 
on which Central Greyhound turned, and that decision does not control.”).   
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price of the good or service purchased.93  Thus, unlike the gross receipts and 
corporate income taxes, which require apportionment, the sales tax does not.94   
3. Judicial Bases for Sales Tax Exceptionalism 
The judicial decisions treating the sales tax differently for jurisdictional 
and apportionment purposes ultimately reach their results based on 
administrative and structural considerations.  In particular, the Supreme Court 
established the physical presence standard in Bellas Hess due in large part to its 
concern that allowing thousands of taxing jurisdictions each to require remote 
retailers to collect sales tax would burden interstate commerce and “entangle” 
multi-state businesses in a “virtual welter of complicated obligations.”95  Upon 
reconsideration of the substantial nexus standard in Quill, the Court also 
expressed concern over the potential retroactive application of the sales tax if the 
Court were to change from physical presence standard, particularly in light of the 
reliance by the mail-order industry on that standard during the twenty-five years 
since the Court’s decision in Bellas Hess.96   
In contrast, the state courts that have held economic presence to suffice 
as “substantial nexus” for corporate income tax purposes have characterized the 
income tax as less administratively burdensome than the sales tax.  For example, 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals in A&F Trademark noted that a “state 
income tax is usually paid only once a year, to one taxing jurisdiction and at one 
rate, [but] a sales and use tax can be due periodically to more than one taxing 
jurisdiction within a state and at varying rates.”97  Thus, the state courts have 
focused on the fact that the simpler administrative aspects of the corporate 
income tax impose less of a burden on interstate commerce than the sales tax.  
State courts have also expressed less concern over the reliance by remote retailers 
on an established nexus standard in the corporate income tax context, since no 
Supreme Court case has firmly established such a standard.98  
                                                
93 Id. at 184–91 (discussing apportionment). 
94 The sales tax is not the only tax that the Court has found not to require apportionment.  
In Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989), the Court held that Illinois’ Telecommunications 
Excise Tax also did not require apportionment.  In reaching that holding, the Court agreed with 
Illinois that the excise tax “has the same economic effect as a sales tax.”  Id. at 262 (“The tax at 
issue has many of the characteristics of a sales tax.”).   
95 Quill Corp. v. N. D. ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992) (quoting National 
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967)).    
96 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317 (“[T]he Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and 
has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry.”).   
97 A&F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting 
Kmart Props, Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep’t. of N.M., 139 N.M. 177, 185 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2001)).   
98 A&F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 194 (“[S]ince the physical-presence requirement has 
never been established by judicial precedent for other forms of taxation [than the sales tax] . . . , we 
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In the apportionment context, the Court’s decision to require 
apportionment for the gross receipts tax but not for the sales tax turned primarily 
on concern over the potential for duplicative taxation with the former tax but not 
with the latter.99  Because Oklahoma was the only state in which the sale of the 
bus tickets and provision of some of the services related to that sale occurred, the 
Court found that Oklahoma was also the only state that could legitimately apply 
its sales tax to the transaction in Jefferson Lines.100  In contrast, the Court in 
Central Greyhound acknowledged that, because a share of the receipts were 
attributable to bus services provided in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, those 
states could rightfully apply their own gross receipts taxes to the bus ticket sales 
in question in Central Greyhound.101  This would, of course, result in duplicate 
taxation if New York were permitted to apply its gross receipts tax to the full 
sales price of the bus tickets.   
None of the decisions—Bellas Hess, Quill, the state court cases 
addressing the nexus standard for the corporate income tax, Central Greyhound, 
or Jefferson Lines—discussed the theoretical foundations for the taxes at issue or 
whether those foundations support different treatment of the taxes.  Such a 
discussion is warranted, however, for several reasons.  First, in assessing judicial 
rules such as the substantial nexus rules relating to the sales tax and the corporate 
income tax, it only makes sense to ask whether those rules are consistent with the 
theories underlying the taxes involved.  Second, technological and legal changes 
may now render obsolete some of the judicial rationale for the different treatment 
given to the sales tax and the corporate income tax in earlier jurisprudence.102  
For example, the Court would almost certainly need to reconsider the burden 
argument relied on so heavily in Bellas Hess—and carried forward, though relied 
on to a lesser degree, in Quill—if it heard a comparable case today.103  Since 
                                                                                                                     
dismiss the possibility that analogous substantial reliance, as contemplated in Quill, exists in this 
case.”).   
99 See Central Greyhound Lines of N.Y. v. Mealey 334 U.S. 653, 662 (1948) (“If New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania could claim their right to make appropriately apportioned claims against 
that substantial part of the business of appellant to which they afford protection, we do not see how 
on principle and in precedent such a claim could be denied.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995) (“The taxable event comprises agreement, payment, and 
delivery of some of the services in the taxing State; no other State can claim to be the site of the 
same combination.”).  
100 Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 191.  Moreover, because every state with a use tax 
provides a credit for sales tax paid in any other states, none of the other states through which the 
Jefferson Lines bus passed could apply their use tax to the ticket purchase.   
101 Central Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 662.   
102 See infra Section II.C.   
103 See Waltreese Carroll, Tax Academics Diverge on Constitutionality of Colorado’s 
“Amazon” Law, 2012 ST. TAX TODAY 128-1 (July 3, 2012) (quoting Professor Edward Zelinsky as 
stating that “although Quill is controlling law, it is an opinion that many believe would be decided 
differently if the U.S. Supreme Court were ruling today.”).   
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1967, when Bellas Hess was decided, and even since 1992, when the Court 
decided Quill, technological advances have made it simpler to track and 
determine sales tax liability.104  Moreover, several commercial providers now 
offer sales tax calculation services for businesses, whereas this service was 
virtually nonexistent even a decade ago.105   
But perhaps most importantly, almost half the states have made 
substantial efforts to conform their sales tax statutes and thereby make sales tax 
collection by remote retailers significantly less onerous.  In particular, twenty-
four states have joined the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (the 
“SSUTA”), a multi-state compact established in direct response to the Quill 
Court’s assessment that the sheer number of sales tax jurisdictions (and the 
variability of statutes and ordinances within those jurisdictions) would create an 
undue burden on interstate commerce if remote retailers were required to collect 
sales tax.106  The SSUTA seeks to mitigate this burden by requiring, among other 
things, that member states (1) designate a single entity for administration of both 
state and local taxes, so that taxpayers need file returns with only one 
administrative body;107 (2) maintain uniform tax bases and tax definitions for 
both state and local sales tax purposes;108 (3) notify sellers of changes in the state 
sales tax laws;109 (4) provide and maintain a database of all sales tax rates for all 
                                                
104 Saul Hansell, Amazon Plays Dumb in Internet Sales Tax Debate, N.Y. TIMES BITS 
BLOG (Feb. 13, 2008, 12:47 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/amazon-plays-dumb-in-
internet-sales-tax-debate (reporting the statement by Netflix CEO Reed Hastings that complying 
with sales and use tax collection requirements is “not very hard”).  See also 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, RETAIL SALES TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS: A NATIONAL ESTIMATE 
(2006), available at http://www.bacssuta.org/Cost%20of%20Collection%20Study%20-
%20SSTP.pdf (estimating average compliance cost for sales tax collection at 0.13% of taxable 
sales for large businesses (over $10 million in annual sales); 0.32% of taxable sales for mid-sized 
businesses (between $1 million and $10 million in annual sales); and 0.82% of taxable sales for 
small businesses (between $150,000 and $1 million in annual sales)); but see Patrick M. Byrne and 
Jonathan E. Johnson, III, The Rights and Wrongs of Taxing Internet Retailers, WALL ST. J., July 24, 
2012, at A15 (stating that it took their company, Overstock.com, a “team of 20–30 experienced IT 
professionals over five months to install, test and integrate the software that lets us properly 
calculate use tax in one additional state,” at a cost of $1.3 million).   
105 See STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., “Certified Service Providers,” 
available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=Certified-Service-Providers 
(listing certified service providers that provide sales tax calculation and collection services for 
retailers) (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).   
106 See STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., “About Us,” 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=About-Us (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
107 STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., Streamlined Sales & Use Tax 
Agreement (“SSUTA”) § 301(A) (amended May 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=modules.   
108 Id. § 302.   
109 Id. § 304(A).   
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jurisdictions levying taxes within the state;110 and (5) provide and maintain a 
database that assigns each five-digit and nine-digit zip code within a member 
state to the proper tax rates and jurisdictions.111  The SSUTA also relieves sellers 
from liability if they collect the wrong amount of sales tax while relying on the 
database information provided by the states.112  In sum, the SSUTA goes a long 
way toward simplifying and coordinating the collection and payment of sales tax 
in the twenty-four member states.   
Yet despite these developments, the physical-presence standard 
applicable to the sales tax might still find support in the tax’s theoretical 
underpinnings.  If so, the physical-presence standard should continue to control.  
Thus, the next section explores the theoretical foundations for the sales tax and 
the corporate income tax and then asks whether those foundations support 
different jurisdictional standards for the taxes.   
II. ASSESSING THE THEORETICAL BASIS (OR LACK THEREOF) 
FOR SALES TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
Of course, the “primary, intended, real effect of any general revenue-
raising tax,” such as the corporate income tax or the sales tax, is “to curtail some 
part of the private consumption of economic resources that would otherwise 
occur, in order to free those resources for public use, including redistribution to 
the poor.”113  In other words, taxes are, at their heart, meant to transfer resources 
from the individual to the state and fund state services, which may include the 
redistribution of wealth.  The corporate income tax and the sales tax both seek to 
accomplish this goal, but they do so by taxing different aspects of economic well-
being.  As explained by Professor Michael McIntyre, a taxpayer’s economic 
well-being may be measured by the following components: “(1) personal 
consumption; (2) realized income; (3) imputed income from home ownership; 
and (4) undistributed income derived from ownership of shares in a 
corporation.”114  States typically tax each of these components of economic well-
being through their sales tax, individual income tax, property tax, and corporate 
income tax, respectively.115   
In effect, then, the sales tax serves as a tax on personal consumption, 
which constitutes one measure of a taxpayer’s economic well-being.  The 
                                                
110 Id. § 305(E).   
111 Id. § 305(F).   
112 Id. § 306(A).   
113 William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1165 (1974).   
114 Michael J. McIntyre, Thoughts on the Future of the State Corporate Income Tax, 25 
ST. TAX NOTES 931, 932 (2002).  This definition ultimately derives from the Haig–Simon definition 
of income: “personal consumption plus the net change in wealth over the taxable period.”  Id. at n.6 
(citing HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 59 (1938)).   
115 Id. at 932.   
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corporate income tax targets undistributed corporate income, another measure of 
taxpayer wealth.  In taxing undistributed income, the corporate income tax also 
prevents taxpayers from using corporations as income shielding devices.116  In 
short, the sales tax and the corporate income tax each tax different aspects of an 
individual’s economic well-being.   
Both taxes also serve another purpose, at least in theory.  The sales tax 
and corporate income tax both operate as charges imposed on taxpayers by the 
state for the privilege of participating in an orderly marketplace.117  The sales tax 
has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “a tax on the freedom of 
purchase.”118  As such, the tax may be viewed as compensating the state for 
allowing the exercise of that freedom by providing a marketplace in which 
purchasers may acquire goods and services. 119  Likewise, the corporate income 
tax may be viewed as “a charge on corporations for providing them with a market 
in which to sell their goods and services and providing them with the 
infrastructure needed to produce those goods and services.”120  Thus, courts have 
justified the imposition of both taxes based on the orderly marketplace that the 
state provides for commerce.121   
                                                
116 At the federal level, the accumulated income penalty serves this explicit purpose.   
117 This theory of taxation—that the state is justified in collecting taxes based on the 
benefits provided by the state to taxpayers—is known as the “benefit theory.”  In addition to 
justifying the imposition of state taxes, the benefit theory also serves as a limit on the states’ ability 
to tax.  The Supreme Court long ago said that a state may not exact a tax unless the tax “bears fiscal 
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.”  Wis. v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 
U.S. 435, 444 (1940).  This concept is presently embodied in Complete Auto’s fourth prong, that a 
state tax must be “fairly related” to the services provided by the state.  Complete Auto Transit Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977). 
118 McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 331 (1944).  
119 The sales tax is typically charged against the purchaser, rather than the retailer, and 
the retailer simply serves as the state’s agent for collecting the tax.  See HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at ¶ 12.01 (explaining that even in states denominating their tax as a 
“vendor tax,” the economic incidence of the tax typically falls on the consumer).   
120 McIntyre, supra note 114, at 933.   
121 See, e.g., A&F Trademark Inc. v Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 192 (N.C. App. 2004) 
(“[B]y providing an orderly society in which the related retail companies conduct business, North 
Carolina has made it possible for the taxpayers to earn income pursuant to the licensing 
agreements.”); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 22 (S.C. 1993) (“By providing 
an orderly society in which Toys R Us conducts business, South Carolina has made it possible for 
Geoffrey to earn income pursuant to the royalty agreement.”); McIntyre, supra note 114, at 934 
(“The states have contributed to the creation and maintenance of a marketplace where corporations 
can sell goods at a profit.  They have also contributed to the creation of the infrastructure—
educated workforce, roads, utilities, courts, police, and so forth—needed for the production of 
goods and services.”).  This same “benefits” argument has been discussed in cases involving the 
sales tax.  For example, in his dissent in Quill, Justice White argued that North Dakota was justified 
in asserting its sales tax because:  
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While the corporate income tax and the sales tax both serve at least three 
common purposes—raising funds for the state, taxing economic well-being, and 
taxing the benefit of an orderly marketplace provided by the state122—each also 
serves distinct purposes, as further discussed below.  The reason for exploring 
these distinct purposes is to assess whether the different theoretical bases for the 
taxes justify the different jurisdictional standards that courts have afforded them.   
A. Theoretical Foundations for the Sales Tax 
The sales tax is a form of consumption tax.  As such, the sales tax may 
be justified under a number of theories.  First, the sales tax applies only to that 
portion of an individual’s economic well-being that is actually put to use (i.e., 
consumed).  It allows savings to escape taxation, or at least defers taxing savings 
until those savings are eventually consumed.  This has the theoretical benefit of 
eliminating the deadweight loss from a tax on savings and should increase 
savings rates. 123  Academics have frequently cited the pro-savings effects of 
consumption taxes as a justification for them,124 though this may be viewed more 
as a criticism of the income tax rather than as a theoretical justification for 
consumption taxes.125  Perhaps another way to think of this theory, then, is that 
                                                                                                                     
[A]n out-of-state direct marketer derives numerous commercial benefits from 
the State in which it does business.  These advantages include laws establishing sound 
local banking institutions to support credit transactions; courts to ensure collection of the 
purchase price from the seller's customers; means of waste disposal from garbage 
generated by mail-order solicitations; and creation and enforcement of consumer 
protection laws, which protect buyers and sellers alike, the former by ensuring that they 
will have a ready means of protecting against fraud, and the latter by creating a climate of 
consumer confidence that inures to the benefit of reputable dealers in mail-order 
transactions. 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (1992) 
122 The academic literature indicates that of these three, the revenue-raising purpose was 
foremost in the minds of state policymakers when the states first enacted general sales taxes in the 
early 1930s.  See, e.g., JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL 
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 1 (2d ed. 1994) (“The sales tax was initially a desperation 
measure, borne out of the inability of states in the depression years of the 1930s to finance basic 
functions from existing sources, and the pressure on the states to transfer the property tax to the 
local governments.”).   
123 See Barbara H. Fried, Fairness & the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 962 
(1992).   
124 See Zelenak, infra note 131, at 605–06; Warren, infra note 133, at 1097–101; 
Andrews, supra note 113, at 1173 (stating, though not necessarily agreeing, that “it seems to be 
assumed that the net effect of the shift toward a consumption base would favor saving”).    
125 A lengthy and robust debate has taken place in the academic literature regarding the 
superiority of the consumption tax or the income tax.  See Carolyn C. Jones, Treatment of 
Gratuitous Transfers: Unraveling the Case for a Consumption Tax, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1155, 
1160 (1985) (“The debate on whether the income or consumption tax is more fair has been 
relatively lengthy in time and number of pages.”).   
2013] SALES TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 161 
the sales tax serves beneficial policy purposes in what it does not do (tax savings), 
in addition to what it does do (provide a revenue source for the state).   
More “affirmative” theories as to why we tax consumption also exist.  
For example, Professor Carolyn Jones has characterized consumption taxes, such 
as the sales tax, as utility-based taxes.126  According to Professor Jones, a 
taxpayer derives “utility”—pleasurable experience or perceptions 127 —from 
consumption and “any utility generating transaction should be taxed.”128  Thus, 
one justification for taxing consumption is that consumption results in utility to 
the consumer,129 and it is this utility that is in fact taxed.130   
Another rationale for the sales tax, known as the “common pool” theory, 
is somewhat more abstract than either the pro-savings or utility theories.  Under 
the common pool theory, taxes should apply when a taxpayer converts scarce 
resources to “private preclusive use.”131  This theory, which has been traced back 
to writings by Thomas Hobbes,132 provides that “unconsumed resources are left 
in a common pool” and “it is inappropriate to tax a person until he withdraws his 
resources [from the common pool] for personal consumption.”133  In other words, 
savings should not be taxed while remaining in the common pool, where the 
savings benefit society generally.  According to this theory, resources in the 
common pool “can be characterized as socially desirable in that the capital so 
supplied will increase both future production and the future productivity of 
                                                
126 Id. at 1171.  In her article, Professor Jones was discussing a cash-flow consumption 
tax rather than a sales tax, but the justifications for the tax discussed in her article and repeated here 
apply to both types of taxes.  See id. at 1156 (distinguishing the consumption tax from the sales tax 
or value-added tax based on a progressive rate structure).   
127 Id. at 1162.   
128 Id. at 1168.   
129 In the context of voluntary transactions, a taxpayer would presumably not enter into a 
transaction unless the result of the transaction (the good or service received) exceeded the 
taxpayer’s utility in simply maintaining the status quo and not entering into the transaction.  
130 Of course, each individual may experience a different level of “utility” from a given 
experience.  Any practical consumption tax must use an objective measure of utility, since an 
individualized measure would be unworkable.  For the sales tax, the measure of utility is the market 
price of the good or service purchased.   
131 Lawrence Zelenak, Commentary: The Reasons for a Consumption Tax & the Tax 
Treatment of Gifts and Bequests, 51 TAX L. REV. 601, 605 (1996) (identifying as a rationale of 
consumption tax that “taxation should reach only ‘private preclusive use’ of scarce resources”).   
132 The common pool theory derives from Hobbes’ question: “For what reason is there, 
that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more 
charged, then he that living idly, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one has no more 
protection from the commonwealth, than the other?”  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 226 (M. 
Oakeshott ed. 1960).  
133 Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1081, 1094 (1980).   
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workers.” 134   It is only upon that withdrawal from the common pool for 
individual consumption that taxation is justified.   
Some commentators have criticized the common pool theory as failing to 
“capture the reality of existing legal relationships in our society.”135  After all, the 
common pool is only “common” in the sense of being the aggregate of 
unconsumed resources.  Legal restraints prevent anyone other than the owner of 
specific assets within the common pool from acquiring those assets.136  Despite 
its detractors, the common pool theory continues to appear in the academic 
literature and, along with the pro-savings and utility theories, serves as one of the 
primary justifications for consumption taxes like the sales tax.137   
B. Theoretical Foundations for the Corporate Income Tax 
Scholars have provided several justifications for the corporate income 
tax.  One holds that the corporate income tax “reflects the belief that 
corporations . . . constitute distinct, taxable entities separate from their 
investors.”138  Under this theory, a corporation is taxed separately from its 
shareholders because of its particular corporate characteristics.  As explained by 
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser:  
Corporate characteristics of free transferability of interests, 
continuity of life, limited liability and centralized 
management . . . emphasized the distinction between the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Corporate liability was not 
shareholder liability.  The life of the corporation was 
independent of that of its shareholders.  As corporations grew 
and ownership became separated from management, 
shareholders became increasingly passive and lost a sense of 
identification with the corporation.  The corporation became a 
separate entity.139   
The idea that a corporation is an entity separate from its owners seems 
almost an afterthought today, but, as explained by Professor Kornhauser, during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the issue was subject to serious debate, with opponents of the corporate 
                                                
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 1095 (“That pool is not collectively owned, but held privately by shareholders 
whose shares are simply their claims on unconsumed product.”).   
137 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Debt-Financed Consumption and a Hybrid Income-
Consumption Tax, 64 TAX L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2010) (discussing the common pool theory and its 
critique).   
138 Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 
889, 890–91 (2006).   
139 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 61 (1990). 
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tax characterizing corporations as an aggregate of the individual owners.140  It 
was only after years of sustained debate that “[l]egal theory . . . veered toward a 
natural entity theory in the corporate area.”141  Thus, one possible explanation for 
the corporate income tax is that the corporation constitutes a separate and distinct 
entity from its shareholders, with rights and privileges that justify the government 
(be it federal or state) imposing a tax on the entity.142  Of course, the limited 
liability granted to corporate shareholders is one of those privileges, and the 
double taxation resulting from the corporate income tax may be viewed as the 
“cost” of the state allowing this benefit.143   
A second theory of the corporate income tax proposes that the tax serves 
the more mundane purpose of acting as a tax withholding and collection 
mechanism for corporate shareholders.144  This theory, as explained by Professor 
Steven Bank, contends that “the corporate income tax was originally adopted as a 
substitute or ‘proxy’ for taxing corporate shareholders directly.”145  The need to 
collect taxes at the entity level, rather than individual shareholder level, came 
about as a result of the expanded use of the corporate form during the late 
nineteenth century.  With that expansion, states recognized the inadequacy of 
general property taxes in detecting and taxing stock holdings.  Pursuant to the 
general property taxes in effect at the time, shareholders were required to self-
report the value of the corporate stock they owned.  As one might expect, gross 
understatements of value were common (when shareholders reported their stock 
                                                
140 Id. at 58–60 (describing the debate about aggregate or entity theory with respect to the 
corporation during the Progressive Era).  Interestingly, although the idea that a corporation is an 
entity separate from its shareholders is widely accepted today, recent corporate theory also views 
corporations as a nexus of contracts.  See id. at 136 (“[T]oday's pet theory, the economic theory of 
the firm as a nexus of contracts between individuals, tends to eliminate the corporation as an 
entity.”).   
141 See id. at 61. 
142 President Taft alluded to the separate entity theory as support for the enactment of the 
federal corporate income tax in 1909.  In a message to Congress, President Taft wrote that the 
proposed corporate tax was “an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business as an artificial 
entity and of freedom from a general partnership liability enjoyed by those who own the stock.”  
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1193, 1218 (2004) (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909) (statement of President Taft)).   
143 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 142, at 1205–06 (“The [corporate income] tax is 
conceived as a payment in return for the benefits of incorporation, such as limited liability.”).    
144 Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 450–52 (2001) (“[T]he corporate income tax was originally adopted 
as a substitute or ‘proxy’ for taxing corporate shareholders directly.”).  President Taft’s statement to 
Congress in support of the 1909 corporate income tax also mentioned the administrative benefit of 
collecting tax from the corporation rather than from individual shareholders as a reason to enact the 
corporate income tax: “[The corporate income tax] imposes a burden at the source of the income at 
a time when the corporation is well able to pay and when collection is easy.”  44 CONG. REC. 3344 
(1909) (statement of President Taft).   
145 Bank, supra note 144, at 452.   
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holdings at all).146  Professor Bank explains, “Tax evasion was so prevalent 
toward the end of the nineteenth century that it ‘was often perpetrated openly and 
defiantly.’”147  Both the federal and state governments recognized the need to 
collect taxes at the income source (the corporation), rather than from individual 
shareholders.  As stated in a Wisconsin State Tax Commissioner report in 1903:  
The wealth of the country in personalty consists largely of 
investments in corporate securities, stocks, and bonds in railroad 
and other corporations which are not and cannot be reached for 
taxation to the holders by the severest and most inquisitorial laws.  
The taxation of corporations as legal entities is the only 
recourse.148   
Thus, the purpose of the corporate income tax was to facilitate collection 
of taxes that shareholders were otherwise failing to pay.   
Under a third theory, the corporate income tax originated as a means of 
checking the expansion of corporate power.  According to the proponents of this 
theory, the corporate income tax serves as “a regulatory tool to publicize and 
control the wealth and power of corporate managers and owners.”149  This theory 
has been espoused by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, who points out that:  
[corporate] resources are managed by individual corporate 
managers, and their control over such resources gives them 
significant economic, social, and political power.  In that sense, 
imposing a corporate tax that reduces the economic resources 
available to corporate managers also reduces the power of 
corporate management.150   
Professor Avi-Yonah provides a detailed historical account of the 
enactment of the federal corporate income tax in 1909.  In recounting that history, 
he quotes at length the rationale given by President Taft for his support of the tax:  
Another merit of this tax is the federal supervision which must 
be exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual 
accounts and business transactions of all corporations.  While the 
                                                
146 See id. at 508–15.   
147 Id. at 519.   
148 Roswell C. McCrea, A Suggestion on the Taxation of Corporations, 19 Q.J. ECON. 498, 
499 n.1 (1905) (quoting a Representative of the Wisconsin State Tax Commission (1903)).  
149 Ajay Mehrotra, The Public Control of Corporate Power: Revisiting the 1909 
Corporate Tax From a Comparative Perspective, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 492, 494 (2010).  
See also Kornhauser, supra note 139 (arguing that the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 constituted an 
attempt to regulate corporations).   
150 Avi-Yonah, supra note 142, at 1211.  Interestingly, Professor Bank has argued that 
corporate management has essentially acquiesced in corporate taxation because the resulting double 
taxation “helps persuade shareholders to allow managers to retain earnings and invest them free of 
substantial monitoring.”  Bank, supra note 144, at 535.   
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faculty of assuming a corporate form has been of the utmost 
utility in the business world, it is also true that substantially all of 
the abuses and all of the evils which have aroused the public to 
the necessity of reform were made possible by the use of this 
very faculty.  If now, by a perfectly legitimate and effective 
system of taxation, we are incidentally able to possess the 
Government and the stockholders and the public of the 
knowledge of the real business transactions and the gains and 
profits of every corporation in the country, we have made a long 
step toward that supervisory control of corporations which may 
prevent a further abuse of power.151 
According to Professor Avi-Yonah, the corporate income tax was 
intended to “regulate management directly by reducing corporate wealth” and 
thereby “restricting managerial power.” 152   The perceived need to restrict 
corporate power arose because of the unprecedented consolidation of power 
during the early years of the twentieth century from “a system of owner/manager 
enterprises operating in a largely unregulated competitive market to a system 
dominated by a relatively few large, mostly non-owner managed corporations in 
a regulated competitive market.”153  Professor Avi-Yonah argues, “To tax the 
powerful trusts was seen as the beginning of a federal power to regulate and 
potentially destroy them.”154    
Finally, Professor Bank has more recently presented another theory for 
corporate taxation—that the corporate income tax originated as a means of 
dealing with the threat to tax revenues resulting from “capital lock-in.”155  Capital 
lock-in refers to “the corporation’s ability to commit both capital and the 
earnings from capital to the firm so that it may not be recovered by shareholders, 
or the creditors of shareholders, in the absence of action by the firm’s board of 
directors.”156   Bank contends that lock-in allowed for greater confidence in 
corporate stability by preventing a corporate investor from “unilaterally 
                                                
151 Avi-Yonah, supra note 142, at 1219 (quoting 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909) (statement 
of President Taft)).   
152 Id. at 1225. 
153 Kornhauser, supra note 139, at 55.   
154 Avi-Yonah, supra note 142, at 1231.  Professor Avi-Yonah goes on to explain that the 
need to control corporate power persists today and “therefore that the corporate tax is justified as a 
means to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of corporate management, 
which is inconsistent with a properly functioning liberal democratic polity.”  Id. at 1244.   
155 Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 
889 (2006).   
156 Id. at 891–92.   
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withdraw[ing] his share of the business by placing the power both to dispose of 
firm assets and to distribute profits in the hands of a board of directors.”157   
With the increasing separation between ownership and management that 
resulted from the prevalence of diffuse and widespread stock ownership, 
corporations were viewed as more stable than business entities such as 
partnerships that are subject to withdrawal demands by their owners.  According 
to Bank, the corporate income tax “served as a pro-business compromise between 
the retained earnings penalty that could result from partnership or accrual-style 
taxation and the indefinite deferral that would result from having only a 
distributions tax.”158  Thus, the corporate tax allowed corporations to retain the 
benefit of greater stability through capital lock-in, but also prevented perpetual 
tax deferral by applying a tax to undistributed earnings.     
C. Lack of Solid Theoretical Justifications for Different Nexus 
Standards 
The various theoretical foundations for the sales tax and the corporate 
income tax provide, at best, a tenuous justification for the taxes’ different nexus 
standards.  Most of the theoretical foundations for both taxes have no apparent 
connection to the issue of their jurisdictional scope.  The one exception is 
Professor Avi-Yonah’s theory that the corporate income tax was intended to 
serve as a check on potentially expansive corporate power, though ultimately this 
theory also fails to provide a direct justification for the different jurisdictional 
standards between the sales tax and the corporate income tax.159   
In essence, Professor Avi-Yonah has characterized the corporate income 
tax as an attempt by legislators to regulate and control corporate influence.160  
That same justification could be cited to justify a more expansive jurisdictional 
scope for the corporate income tax than for the sales tax.  And, in fact, the 
economic presence standard generally applicable to the corporate income 
provides a broader taxing jurisdiction than the physical presence standard 
applicable to the sales tax.  This is illustrated by the taxation of some of the 
nation’s largest Internet retailers.  Despite millions of dollars of sales in 
individual states, these Internet retailers avoid sales tax obligations under Quill 
but face income tax liability under the broader economic presence doctrine.161   
                                                
157 Id. at 892.   
158 Id. at 894.   
159 Avi-Yonah, supra note 142, at 1196 (arguing that the corporate income tax, when 
adopted in 1909, “was viewed primarily as a regulatory device to limit the power of management”).   
160 Id. at 1249 (“The corporate tax is justified as a way for a liberal democratic state to 
limit excessive accumulations of power in the hands of corporate management, which is 
inconsistent with both democratic and egalitarian ideals.”).   
161 Of course, even the largest Internet retailers may also avoid state corporate income tax 
liability if they come within the safe harbor provided by P.L. 86-272 (the Interstate Income Act of 
1959, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384).  This, however, is a statutory protection afforded to 
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If Professor Avi-Yonah is right, and the corporate income tax serves the 
regulatory purpose he suggests, then a broader jurisdictional reach for the tax (as 
compared to the sales tax) may make sense.  After all, the theoretical 
justifications for the sales tax (utility-based taxation and the common pool theory, 
in particular) fail to establish the same type of broader societal purpose for the 
sales tax.  The pro-savings nature of the sales tax does provide a policy-oriented 
justification for the tax, but not one that has a connection to the jurisdictional 
scope of the tax.  Rather, as previously noted, the pro-savings argument really 
addresses the issue of whether consumption taxes (including the sales tax) are 
preferable to income taxes, not whether these taxes should have the same 
jurisdictional standards as the income tax.162   
But justifying the different jurisdictional standards of the sales tax and 
the corporate income tax by citing to the regulatory nature of the corporate 
income tax is subject to serious criticism.  First, there is the question of whether 
the corporate income tax in fact serves the regulatory purpose Professor Avi-
Yonah suggests.  At least one notable commentator, Professor Bank, has argued 
that corporate managers actually support the corporate income tax because it 
allows them to retain greater financial resources (and therefore greater potential 
power and influence) within the corporation than they would otherwise be able to 
do if there were no corporate income tax.163  Consistent with this argument, 
Professor Bank contends that without a corporate income tax, shareholders would 
require distributions from the corporations in which they invest more than they 
currently do.164  
Moreover, even if Professor Avi-Yonah is correct and the income tax 
does reduce corporate power, the question remains as to whether taxation 
constitutes the most effective means of accomplishing this goal.  Perhaps more 
                                                                                                                     
companies that sell only tangible goods, and does not amount to a constitutional standard, like the 
physical presence standard established in Bellas Hess and affirmed in Quill.  Moreover, because 
many of the largest Internet retailers like Amazon also sell intangible goods (such as cloud 
computing services), they should not benefit from P.L. 86-272 and should be paying corporate 
income tax to the states.  See Shanske, supra note 71, at 157 (arguing that Amazon has nexus with 
California despite P.L. 86-272 and the state should “get to it” collecting corporate income tax from 
the Internet retailer).   
162 In addition, if the regulatory justification for the corporate income tax is correct, the 
theory would seem to have increased relevance in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  In Citizens United the Court held that the First 
Amendment prohibits restrictions on independent political expenditures by corporations.  
Following that decision, several commentators expressed concerns over the potential increase of 
corporate influence on the political process.  The broader jurisdictional scope of the corporate 
income tax allows for a counterbalance to the corporate influence that these commentators predict. 
163 Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2001). 
164 Id.  
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direct regulation, through greater disclosure requirements under the securities law 
for example, would operate more effectively in checking corporate power.  
Additionally, if taxation itself constitutes an indirect means of reducing corporate 
influence, the jurisdictional scope of the tax used to curtail that corporate 
influence is one step further removed from the purported goal of corporate 
regulation.   
In short, there may be a connection between the regulatory theory for the 
corporate income tax and the broader scope given that tax than given the sales tax, 
but the connection is both controversial and tenuous.  In contrast, a consistent 
trend in the area of state taxation (discussed in the next section) argues strongly 
in favor of aligning the tax jurisdiction of the sales tax and the corporate income 
tax.  
III. THE INCREASING PECULIARITY OF DIFFERENT NEXUS 
STANDARDS FOR THE SALES TAX AND THE CORPORATE 
INCOME TAX 
The disparate jurisdictional treatment of the sales tax and the state 
corporate income tax seems increasingly peculiar in light of a “convergence” 
between the two taxes in recent years.  This convergence has occurred because of 
the move to apportion the income tax based exclusively on sales, with no weight 
given to the other traditional apportionment factors of payroll and property.   
As discussed above, states traditionally allocated taxable income among 
states according to the three-factor (payroll, property, and sales) formula set forth 
in UDITPA.165  The theory behind the traditional three-factor formula was that 
the factors “appear in combination to reflect a very large share of the activities by 
which value is generated,” and the value derived by the taxpayer’s activities in a 
state is what the income tax seeks to tax.166  UDITPA assigned equal weight to 
each of the factors in apportioning a taxpayer’s income.167  Over time, however, 
many states have moved away from the three-factor apportionment method, 
choosing instead to focus more heavily, or even exclusively, on the sales 
factor.168  In fact, as of May 2012, at least twenty-two states have either already 
                                                
165 At one point, forty-four out of forty-six states imposing a corporate income tax used 
UDITPA’s three-factor formula to apportion income.  See Moorman Mfg. Co. v Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 
284 n.1 (1978).  
166 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 183 (1983). 
167 UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 9.  See also HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 12, at ¶ 8.06 (discussing the history and justification for the three-factor 
formula).   
168 The move away from UDITPA’s traditional three-factor test by some, but not all, 
states defeats one of the purposes of UDITPA—uniformity.  See Kirk J. Stark, The Quiet 
Revolution in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income Taxation, 23 ST. TAX NOTES 775, 777 (2002) 
(“UDITPA is designed to remedy the problem of inconsistent state statutes concerning the taxation 
of multistate corporations.”).  Of course, the three-factor formula is not the only possible approach 
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converted or are in the process of converting to what is called a “single-sales 
factor” (“SSF”) apportionment method.169  Under SSF apportionment, payroll 
and property are given no consideration in the apportionment of a taxpayer’s 
income.  Revisiting our earlier example in which Taxpayer had 30% of its 
property, 50% of its payroll, and 10% of its sales in State A, State A would be 
entitled to tax only 10% of Taxpayer’s income under an SSF apportionment 
scheme (the proportion of Taxpayer’s sales in State A), rather than the 30% 
taxable under the traditional three-factor formula.170  
Why would a state change to SSF apportionment?171  Relative to the 
traditional three-factor formula, SSF apportionment benefits companies which 
have in-state employees and facilities and which export a significant percentage 
of their products to purchasers in other states.  It penalizes companies with little 
or no in-state employees or facilities that sell their goods into the taxing state.172  
In other words, SSF apportionment favors “in-state” companies and places a 
greater tax burden on “out-of-state” companies relative to the UDITPA regime.  
To illustrate this, consider again our hypothetical Taxpayer.  Taxpayer had to 
apportion 30% of its taxable income to State A under the traditional three-factor 
formula but only 10% under SSF apportionment.  If Taxpayer instead had only 
5% of its property and payroll in State A but made 50% of its sales in the state 
                                                                                                                     
to apportionment.  For example, Connecticut previously used a single-factor property formula, 
which the Supreme Court upheld in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 
(1920).  According to the Supreme Court, “States have wide latitude in the selection of 
apportionment formulas and . . . a formula-produced assessment will only be disturbed when the 
taxpayer has proved by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income attributed to the State is in fact 
‘out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted . . . in that State,’ or has ‘led to a 
grossly distorted result.’”  Moorman, 437 U.S. at 274.  Any apportionment formula, however, must 
meet the Court’s “internal consistency” and “external consistency” requirements.  See Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (discussing these requirements).  States 
have also used formulas other than UDITPA’s three-factor formula or a single-sales factor formula 
to apportion income.   
169 FED’N OF TAX ADM’RS, “State Apportionment of Corporate Income” (revised January 
1, 2013), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/apport.pdf.  The Supreme Court upheld 
Iowa’s single-sales factor apportionment in Moorman.  Iowa’s SSF apportionment formula was not 
adopted in connection with the recent trend.  Rather, it has been in place since 1934, when Iowa 
first adopted its income tax.  See Moorman, 437 U.S. at 283 n.2.     
170 See supra note 70. 
171 As stated by Justice Powell in his dissent in Moorman, “a sales-only formula is 
probably the most illogical of all apportionment methods, since ‘the geographic distribution of a 
corporation’s sales is, by itself, of dubious significance in indicating the locus of either’ a 
corporation’s sources of income or the social costs it generates.”  437 U.S. at 292 n.7 (Powell, J., 
dissenting).   
172 As explained by Justice Powell in dissenting against the Court’s decision to uphold 
Iowa’s SSF apportionment formula in Moorman, “the effect of Iowa’s [SSF] formula . . . is to 
penalize out-of-state manufacturers for selling in Iowa and to subsidize Iowa manufacturers for 
selling in other States.”  Id. at 284.   
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(i.e., if Taxpayer were more of an “importer” with respect to State A), 50% of the 
company’s taxable income would be apportioned to State A.  In effect, a state 
with SSF apportionment assigns no income tax cost  to a corporation’s facilities 
and employees located in the state.173  By using only the sales factor to calculate 
the apportionment ratio, a state effectively imposes its income tax on 
corporations based solely on the burden borne by the state of providing a market 
for the corporations’ goods.  This operates to benefit in-state companies (those 
with property and employees in the state) and, conversely, to penalize out-of-
state companies (those that take advantage of the state’s market, but have no in-
state property or employees).174   
Theoretically, then, a state with SSF apportionment should have a tax 
advantage in convincing corporations to locate or retain their employees and 
facilities in the state, since there is no income tax cost to the corporations for 
doing so.175   From the state’s perspective, despite the possibility of lower 
apportionment ratios than under the traditional three-factor formula, shifting to 
SSF apportionment may make sense in the competition to attract businesses and 
the jobs that come with them.   
But what does SSF apportionment have to do with sales tax 
exceptionalism?  The trend toward SSF apportionment argues against treating the 
income tax and the sales tax differently since the change to SSF apportionment 
may be viewed as a convergence of the two taxes.  This convergence results 
because, as recognized by Professor Charles McLure in 1977, “state corporation 
taxes levied on multistate firms have essentially the same effects as 
discriminatory state taxes on corporate payrolls, property, or sales (at origin or 
destination), if the profits of the firm are allocated among the states for tax 
purposes on the basis of formulas including payrolls, property, and sales.”176  Or, 
as more recently explained by Professor Darien Shanske: 
[A] tax apportioned based on factors (like the CIT [corporate 
income tax]) is actually (in some situations) just a tax on those 
factors.  In the traditional case therefore, the state CIT 
                                                
173 As between the market state and the production state, an SSF formula attributes full 
value to the market state and none to the production state.   
174 See Justice Powell’s dissent in Moorman for another numerical example of how an 
SSF apportionment scheme benefits in-state companies to the detriment of out-of-state companies.  
437 U.S. at 284 n.2.   
175 See Elliott Dubin, Changes in State Corporate Tax Apportionment Formulas and Tax 
Bases, 55 ST. TAX NOTES 563 (2010).  Cf. Shanske, supra note 71, at 113–15 (arguing that 
California’s experience may not bear out the positive economic effects of a shift to SSF 
apportionment).  Of course, other taxes, including property taxes and unemployment insurance, still 
apply to create some tax cost for having property and employees in a state.   
176 Charles E. McLure, Jr., State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing? 1, 
(Off. of Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 25 1977).  See also Charles E. McLure, Jr., Revenue 
Sharing: Alternative to Rational Fiscal Federalism?, 19 PUB. POL’Y 472 (1971). 
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decomposes into a tax on corporate property, employment and 
sales.  By shifting to the SSF, the states are moving only to tax 
the income earned from corporate sales, which makes the CIT a 
kind of sales (i.e., consumption) tax, albeit one placed (at least in 
the first instance) on the seller rather than on the consumer.177   
Consider an example.  Assume that Taxpayer, a remote Internet retailer, 
makes 10% of its sales in State A, a state with SSF apportionment.  Assume 
further that State A has a flat 7% corporate income tax rate.  If Taxpayer has total 
taxable income of $1,000,000, it will owe $7,000 in income tax to State A.  If, 
however, Taxpayer makes 15% of its sales in State A, under these same 
assumptions it will owe $10,500 in income tax to the state.  Taxpayer’s total 
taxable income has not changed: it remains $1,000,000.  Nevertheless, its income 
tax liability in State A has changed, based solely on the amount of sales in that 
state.  In effect, it is the sales, just as much as the taxable income, that drives the 
corporate income tax liability in State A.  As illustrated by this simple example, 
an SSF-apportioned income tax may effectively operate like a sales tax, though 
with taxable income as the tax base rather than sales price.   
Professor McLure provided a rigorous mathematical proof showing that 
“the sales-related portion of the state profits tax is a disguised tax on the 
corporation’s sales, especially in states in which the firm does a small fraction of 
its business.”178  Even with this mathematical proof, however, both McLure and 
Shanske acknowledge the limits that exist in equating a factor-based tax with a 
tax on those factors.  For example, McLure notes that corporate income tax 
“applies only to sales, payrolls, and property in the corporate sector of the 
economy, and distorts choices on sales and production in that state away from the 
corporate form of organization.”179  McLure also recognizes that with the income 
tax, the tax rate may vary according to profitability, whereas the traditional retail 
sales tax applies at a static rate.   
Professor Shanske identifies four limits to the convergence of the 
corporate income tax and the sales tax, the first and fourth of which overlap with 
                                                
177 Shanske, supra note 71, at 116–17.  See also Stark, supra note 168, at 779 (stating that, 
with respect to the traditional three-factor formulary apportionment, “rather than viewing the 
[corporate income tax] as a tax on corporate income per se, it is perhaps more appropriate to view it 
as three separate taxes: a property tax, a payroll tax, and a tax on the company’s gross receipts”); 
but see Michael McIntyre, Thoughts on the Future of the State Corporate Income Tax, 25 ST. TAX 
NOTES 931 (2002) (arguing that there are important differences between a retail sales tax and a 
corporate income tax apportioned under a sales-only formula, including breadth of application and 
uniformity of rate).  As explained by McIntyre, “a corporate tax never operates as a broad-based 
sales tax because the rate of the ‘sales’ function of profits and the tax does not apply to 
unincorporated businesses.”  Id. at 947 n.16.  McClure and Shanske acknowledge this point, as 
discussed below.  
178 McLure, supra note 176, at 17.   
179 Id.   
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those highlighted by Professor McLure: (1) the corporate income tax only applies 
to corporations, not other business forms (similar to McLure’s first point, above); 
(2) a corporation must do business in multiple states for apportionment to apply; 
(3) the income tax only applies to corporations with net income (and, unlike the 
sales tax, not to those with losses); and (4) “the apportionment formula is not the 
same as taxing the transaction itself” as various factors, such as the location of a 
corporation’s profits and sales, may ultimately determine the tax burden on a 
corporation.180  On this last point, for example, if a corporation’s sales are 
“bunched” geographically into a single state, a higher marginal income tax rate 
may apply to the sales than if they were evenly spread among states.   
Thus, an SSF-apportioned corporate income tax is not identical to a sales 
tax, but in many ways it is similar.181  And so, if we accept McLure’s and 
Shanske’s arguments that a tax apportioned according to discrete factors 
replicates a tax on the factors themselves (at least to some degree and under 
certain circumstances), the question arises as to why an income tax apportioned 
solely according to a corporation’s proportion of in-state sales should be treated 
any differently than a sales tax.  After all, if the income tax simply mimics a sales 
tax, why have different jurisdictional standards for the two taxes?  The answer is 
that the two taxes should not have different jurisdictional standards and that the 
current state of the law has become outdated, especially considering the 
technological and legal developments that have taken place since Bellas Hess 
(1967) and even since Quill (1992).182   
But if the corporate income tax has become more like the sales tax as a 
result of the trend toward single sales factor apportionment, perhaps courts 
should adopt the physical-presence standard for both taxes (as currently applies 
to the sales tax) rather than expand the economic-presence standard applied by 
most courts to the corporate income tax.  The arguments for the benefits of 
economic presence over physical presence as the controlling nexus standard for 
both the corporate income tax and the sales tax has been capably set forth by 
other commentators,183 and I do not intend to repeat them here.  My goal has 
instead been to demonstrate (1) that the concept of sales tax exceptionalism, 
                                                
180 Shanske, supra note 71, at 117.   
181 Furthermore, as Professor Shanske contends, an SSF-apportioned income tax serves as 
a complement to the retail sales tax.  It reaches transactions and taxpayers that would be captured 
by a theoretically pure sales tax but escape the relatively narrow retail sales taxes found in most 
states.  See Shanske, supra note 71, at 118–22.   
182 See Waltreese Carroll, Can Technology Lessen the Tax Burdens on Interstate 
Commerce, 2012 ST. TAX TODAY 143-2 (2012) (quoting Charles Collins, Vice President of 
Governmental Affairs at Automatic Data Processing, Inc.—one of six certified service providers 
under the SSUTA—as stating that “technology has moved in a direction that has alleviated the 
burdens at issue in Quill”).   
183 Swain, supra note 31.    
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though not expressly labeled as such, has come about as a result of judicial 
decisions treating the sales tax differently than other taxes; (2) that the concept, at 
least in the context of jurisdictional standards, has little theoretical justification; 
and (3) that the trend toward single sales factor apportionment undercuts the 
different nexus standards applicable to the sales tax and the corporate income tax.   
CONCLUSION 
Legislation to extend the physical-presence standard to the corporate 
income tax has been introduced to Congress;184 so has legislation to apply the 
economic-presence standard to the sales tax.185  Most academic commentators 
(including this one) support the latter approach, but either of these changes would 
be more theoretically defensible than continuing the current jurisdictional 
inconsistency in state tax law—all the more so given the convergence between 
the corporate income tax and the sales tax resulting from the widespread adoption 
of single-sales factor apportionment.   
                                                
184 See Business Activity Tax Simplification Act, S. 1726, 110th Cong. (2007); Business 
Activity Tax Simplification Act, H.R. 5267, 110th Cong. (2008).   
185 See Main Street Fairness Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. (2011); Marketplace Equity Act, 
H.R. 3179, 112th Cong. (2011). Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 1832, 112th Cong. (2011).   
